Abstract-The algebraic immunity of an S-box depends on the number and type of linearly independent multivariate equations it satisfies. In this paper, techniques are developed to find the number of linearly independent, multivariate, bi-affine, and quadratic equations for S-boxes based on power mappings. These techniques can be used to prove the exact number of equations for any class of power mappings. Two algorithms to calculate the number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for any (n; n) S-box based on power mapping are also presented. The time complexity of both algorithms is only O(n 2 ). To design algebraically immune S-boxes, four new classes of S-boxes that guarantee zero bi-affine equations and one class of S-boxes that guarantees zero quadratic equations are presented. The algebraic immunity of power mappings based on Kasami, Niho, Dobbertin, Gold, Welch, and inverse exponents are discussed along with other cryptographic properties and several cryptographically strong S-boxes are identified. It is conjectured that a known Kasami-like highly nonlinear power mapping is differentially 4-uniform. Finally, an open problem to find an (n; n) bijective nonlinear S-box with more than 5n quadratic equations is solved.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE idea behind the algebraic attacks is to express the cipher as a system of multivariate equations whose solution gives the secret key. The complexity of the attack depends on the number of such equations, their type, and their algebraic degree. The first algebraic attack on a block cipher was discussed in [19] . For recent developments in the area of algebraic attacks on block ciphers see [1] , [2] , [5] - [7] , [16] , [17] . In [7] , Courtois and Pieprzyk showed that Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [9] can be attacked by solving an overdefined system of algebraic equations. This is possible because the only nonlinear component in AES, i.e., the S-box, can be expressed as an overdefined system of algebraic equations. The authors presented an algorithm called Extended Sparse Linearization Y. Nawaz is with Advanced Concepts and Technologies, Pitney Bowes Inc., Shelton, CT 06518 USA (e-mail: yassirnawaz@gmail.com).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIT. 2009.2025534 (XSL) to solve this system of multivariate equations and also introduced a parameter, , for S-boxes where is claimed to be an important parameter in measuring the complexity of the XSL algorithm. For a GF GF S-box was defined as , where is the number of equations and is the number of monomials in these equations. A lower value of means a higher value of and therefore higher complexity of the algebraic attack. In [7] , the authors showed that for AES S-box and claimed that for secure ciphers should be greater than . Although was defined to be the measure of algebraic immunity of an S-box in [7] , the relation between the number of equations and the complexity of solving that system of equations seems to be more complex. However, it is generally believed that S-boxes with large number of quadratic equations have low algebraic immunity.
Inspired by [7] , Cheon and Lee [4] developed tools to calculate the number of linearly independent multivariate equations for algebraic S-boxes. They used their results to estimate the algebraic immunity of highly nonlinear and almost bent power S-boxes (based on Gold, Kasami, and inverse exponents [10] ). However, Courtois et al. disputed their results in [8] by showing that in most cases the number of linearly independent multivariate equations calculated by them is incorrect. This was done by experimentally finding the total number of quadratic equations for Gold and Kasami power S-boxes.
In [8, Appendix A], Courtois et al. also used the polynomial representation of the algebraic S-boxes to prove that S-boxes based on inverse mapping in GF have bi-affine equations and quadratic equations. However, they did not generalize their results to other power S-boxes and only provided experimental results for S-boxes based on Gold, Dobbertin, Niho, Welch, and Kasami exponents. The largest S-box experimentally tested by them was . In this paper, we expand and generalize the technique used in [8] . We use the polynomial representations to develop new techniques which can be used to prove the exact number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for any class of power mappings. From these techniques we also develop two very simple algorithms which, given an S-box and the exponent of power mapping, calculate the exact number of bi-affine and quadratic equations, respectively. The time complexity of both algorithms is which is very small even for very large S-boxes (for example, ). The algorithms currently available in literature to find such equations have time complexities that are exponential in and therefore impractical for . Note, however, that these algorithms find the actual equations whereas our algorithms only calculate the number of such equations. Towards designing S-boxes with highest algebraic immunity, we provide four classes of power S-boxes that guarantee zero bi-affine equations and one class that guarantees zero quadratic equations. We examine other cryptographic properties, i.e., nonlinearity, algebraic degree, and uniform differential property of these S-boxes and list cryptographically strong power S-boxes for and . We also provide a new conjecture regarding the uniform differential property of Kasami-like power mappings. In addition to this, we solve an open problem given in [7] , [8] to find a bijective nonlinear S-box with more than quadratic equations.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Let be the finite field of two elements. We consider the domain of an -variable Boolean function to be the vector space over , where is used to denote the addition operator over both and the vector space and is a positive integer. The Hamming weight of an integer is the number of nonzero coefficients in the binary representation of and is denoted by . For a binary string, consecutive ones ( 's) preceded by zero and followed by zero is called a run of ones of length . We consider the runs of ones to be cyclic. has a polynomial representation in such that
ii) Let and be the set consisting of different coset leaders modulo of the elements in . For , assume that there are elements in , say which belong to . Let . Then (3) where (4) where is determined by . Furthermore, the representation in (3) is unique.
Proof: From Proposition 1 we have and we know

Putting
, we have the proof of the assertion (i). For the second assertion, the representation of (3) • if is odd, :
Proof: Proof is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 2:
Let and be a quadratic Boolean function in variables where . Then i) has a polynomial representation in such that -if is even, :
-if is odd, :
ii) For , let and be the set consisting of different coset leaders modulo of the elements in . For , assume that there are elements in , say which belong to . Let . Then (5) where (6) where is determined by . Furthermore, the representation in (5) . The proof for the second assertion is similar to the proof given in Corollary 1. Also, the proof for odd is similar.
A. Bi-Affine Equations
For a given power mapping , we want to find the number of bi-affine equations of the form (7) Let be a bilinear function as defined in Corollary 1. Then, a bi-affine equation exists if and only if (8) Therefore, the number of bi-affine equations, of the form as given in (7), is equal to the number of functions that are affine (i.e., ) in (8) and the inverse exponent belongs to this coset. Based on the above four cases, we now give Algorithm 1 to compute the total number of linearly independent bi-affine equations for a given power mapping over case is trivial).
Remark 1: Cases 2 and 3 are used in Algorithm 1 to easily compute the number of bi-affine equations. The number of equations counted in Cases 2 and 3 is derived from the following result. From (4) in Corollary 1, gives bi-affine equations. We may write where is the th trace term in (4) . For , we may write
For each there are choices of . Thus, for a fixed -tuple , the total number of the solutions for is given by . Since each can be any element in , there are choices for -tuple . Thus, the total number of the solutions for is given by . Therefore, for the coset leader , there are linear independent bi-affine equations. Theorem 1: Let be a power mapping over . Then using Algorithm 1, the total number of linearly independent bi-affine equations can be computed in time . Proof: In Algorithm 1, Step 1 takes time .
Step 2 takes time and Steps 4-9 take time . Therefore, the total time complexity is . Correctness of Algorithm 1 follows from the four cases discussed above.
B. Quadratic Equations
For a given power mapping , we want to find the number of quadratic equations of the form Let be a quadratic function as defined in Corollary 2. Then, a quadratic equation exists if and only if
• for even, :
• for odd, :
Therefore, the number of quadratic equations, of the form as given in (10) , is equal to the number of functions that are quadratic (i.e., . Consider to be even then in (10) will be quadratic in the following cases.
1) If for any
then will give linearly independent quadratic functions. If for any then will give linearly independent quadratic functions. If then will give linearly independent quadratic functions. If then will give linearly independent quadratic functions (as . 2) If for any and , then will give quadratic functions. If for any and , then will give quadratic functions. If and , then will give quadratic functions. If and , then will give quadratic functions.
3) Let
Now we define the set of exponents such that if otherwise.
Note that can be a multiset. If any two exponents from belong to the same coset, , then they will give quadratic functions. In general, if there exist exponents that belong to the same coset, , we will have quadratic functions. 4) If then for some . Therefore, we have linearly independent quadratic functions. Note that odd can be handled in the similar manner and Algorithm 2 can be modified easily by merging the term in the first while loop. Based on the above four cases, we now give Algorithm 2 to compute the total number of linearly independent quadratic equations for a given power mapping over when is even. Also note that Cases 2 and 3 above are derived from (6) in Corollary 2 using a similar argument as in Remark 1.
Algorithm 2 Computing number of linearly independent quadratic equations
Input . Output Total number of independent quadratic equations. From the above discussion we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2:
Let be a power mapping over . Then using Algorithm 2, the total number of linearly independent quadratic equations can be computed in time .
IV. OF CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY SIGNIFICANT POWER MAPPINGS
S-boxes which satisfy zero bi-affine and/or quadratic equations provide optimal resistance against algebraic attacks and therefore are of great interest. In this section, we provide several S-box constructions that satisfy this criterion. A cryptographically strong S-box must also have high nonlinearity, good uniform differential property, and high algebraic degree to resist linear, differential, and higher order differential attacks, respectively. Unfortunately, there are very few S-boxes that satisfy all the above requirements and as increases, finding these S-boxes becomes extremely difficult. Therefore, we identify classes of S-boxes which provably have all the above mentioned properties. We also provide experimental results for smaller values of to identify good S-boxes and show various tradeoffs involved in the selection of an S-box.
A. Power Mappings With Zero Bi-Affine Equations
It is easy to see that the probability of a randomly chosen S-box having zero bi-affine equations is high if is large [7] . This holds true for S-boxes based on power mappings as well. For example, for 18.8% power mappings have zero bi-affine equations. For , 91.1% and for , 99.9% power mappings satisfy this condition. However, note that several highly nonlinear S-boxes (for example, inverse mapping) always have bi-affine equations and therefore it is important to calculate the exact number of bi-affine equations an S-box satisfies. If a power mapping is selected randomly then we can use Algorithm 1 in Section III-A to find the number of bi-affine equations it satisfies. Otherwise, any one of the following S-box constructions can be used. Consider the power mapping over . From Section III-A, the three necessary and sufficient conditions for the power mapping to have zero bi-affine equations are as follows.
1)
and . 2) and . 3) and . Now we provide four power S-box constructions which have zero bi-affine equations. The first construction, given in Theorem 3, consists of S-box based on Kasami-like exponents (see Section IV-C). A subclass of these exponenets, called Kasami exponents was studied by Dobbertin in [10] and mappings based on these exponents were shown to be APN.
Theorem 3:
Let and . Then power mapping over has no bi-affine equations.
Proof: Consider the binary representation of and 1) and from the binary representation of it is obvious that . 2) If where then divides . This means that binary representation of must contain at least two runs of 's of the same length and two runs of 's of same length. We have two runs of 's when . However, in all these cases the lengths of the two runs of 's is always different. For all the other cases we get three runs of 's, however, they will never be of the same length (we always have one run of length and one run of length more than ). Therefore, and . Also, it is evident from the binary representation of that . 3) We know that if two integers and belong to the same coset then some cyclic shift of binary representation of gives . , i.e., all belong to distinct cosets. but the number of runs of 's is different in the two cases.
. Although the Hamming weight in all these cases is the same either the run's of 's and 's are of different length or they appear in different order. Therefore, it is not possible to get one integer from the cyclic shift of the binary representation of another element. Therefore, for each belongs to a distinct coset. Also, only when , however, in both cases the length of runs of 's is different from . The three necessary and sufficient conditions for to have zero bi-affine equations (from Section IV-A) are satisfied.
Note that this mapping is highly nonlinear, has high algebraic degree and good uniform differential property (See Section IV.C).
Theorem 4:
Let and . Then power mapping over has zero bi-affine equations except when . Proof: The proof is given in the Appendix.
The proof technique for Theorems 5 and 6 is similar to that of Theorems 3 and 4. So we provide the theorems without proof.
Theorem 5: Let
, and . Then power mapping over has zero bi-affine equations except when is even and .
Theorem 6: Let , and . Then power mapping over has zero bi-affine equations except for the following:
and .
Several mappings in the constructions given above have good nonlinearity and uniform differential property. For example, consider the construction given in Theorem 4. For , power mapping has nonlinearity and is differentially -uniform. For power mapping has nonlinearity and is differentially -uniform and for power mapping has nonlinearity and is differentially -uniform. Similarly, for construction given in Theorem 5, the mapping in , has nonlinearity and is differentially -uniform. For , mapping has nonlinearity and is differentially -uniform.
B. Power Mappings With Zero Quadratic Equations
If a power mapping is selected randomly then we can use Algorithm 2 given in Section III-B to calculate the number of quadratic equations it satisfies. Otherwise, we provide a construction below to obtain S-box with zero quadratic equations. Consider the power mapping on . We consider the case where is even. The case where is odd is similar. From Section III-B, the three necessary and sufficient conditions for the power mapping to have zero quadratic equations are as follows.
1) and and
2) and and and 3) Let can be a multiset. Then any two elements in belong to different cosets modulo . Table I that the binary representation of is never periodic with period less than . The same reasoning holds for (see Table II ). Also from the binary representation of it is obvious that . Similarly, it is easy to check that mod . 3) If two integers and belong to the same coset then some cyclic shift of binary representation of gives . This means that both and must have the same Hamming weight, the number of runs of 's and 's must be identical, and they must appear in the same order (cyclic). From the binary representations of and , Tables I and  II , it is clear that no two elements of the set (see item 3 of Section IV-B) belong to the same coset. For , the run distribution of is the same as in Table I . If then the run distribution of is the same as given in Table II . Therefore, for items 1, 2, and 3 hold with similar logic. For may generate a carry which results in many possible run distributions depending on the actual value of . Therefore, representing the run distribution of in a tabular form becomes cumbersome. It is tedious (but not very hard) to check that items 1, 2, and 3 hold for as well. Proof for odd is very similar.
It can be proved easily that if is even and then power mapping in Theorem 7 is bijective if and only if . Also, if then the above mapping is bijective if and only if . So if , then by taking to be either or we will always get a bijective S-box. Note that bijective mappings exist for many other values of as well when is odd. Similar conditions can easily be found for odd . The power mapping in Theorem 7 is a subset of the power mapping given in Theorem 4 and several mappings with good nonlinearity and uniform differential property listed for Theorem 4 also belong to the class given in Theorem 7.
C. Cryptographically Strong Kasami Like Power Mappings
A Kasami exponent [13] , , is defined as , and
. If we remove the condition we can write . We will call the Kasami-like exponent. Suppose , and we take then we have and . Note that is the same exponent as in Theorem 3 which has zero bi-affine equations. Based on our extensive experimental results we provide the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1:
Let is odd, and . Then mapping is differentially -uniform. The validity of Conjecture 1 has been verified up to . Note that and therefore the mapping is known to be highly nonlinear [11] . Also, this mapping is always bijective. Now we provide the following theorem without proof. The proof technique is very similar to the one used in Theorem 7.
Theorem 8: Let and . Then power mapping over has quadratic equations.
Note that this mapping has zero bi-affine equations (see Theorem 3), is highly nonlinear, has high algebraic degree, and good uniform differential property. Therefore, it is a suitable candidate for cryptographic applications.
D. of Some Well-Known Power Mappings
Dobbertin investigated some well-known power mappings in [10] , i.e., Gold, Dobbertin, Niho, Welch, inverse, and Kasami. The number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for some of these power mappings have been found experimentally in [8] (for ). However, using the proof techniques given in Sections IV-A and IV-B, the exact number of bi-affine and quadratic equations for the above power mappings can be found out easily. For example, Niho exponent is defined as when is even and when is odd. It can be easily proved that power mapping has zero bi-affine equations for and quadratic equations for . Since power mapping based on Niho exponent is almost bent and APN for odd , it is a good choice for a cryptographically strong S-box in odd number of variables.
TABLE III POWER MAPPINGS WITH ZERO BI-AFFINE EQUATIONS
The power mapping with Dobbertin exponent although APN is not highly nonlinear and its algebraic degree is only . The algebraic degrees of power mappings with Gold and Welch exponents are and , respectively. Therefore, these mappings may not be of cryptographic interest for large values of .
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we give some cryptographically significant power mappings. Table III shows all bijective power mappings which have zero bi-affine equations for and . The second column in the table lists the exponents . Note that is always the coset leader. The other exponents in the same coset, although not listed in the table, have the same properties. The third, fourth, and fifth columns show the algebraic degree, nonlinearity, and differential uniform property of the mapping respectively. The AES S-box (inverse mapping) has degree , nonlinearity , and is differentially -uniform. From Table III it is clear that for , no bijective power mapping having zero bi-affine equations is as good as AES S-box. For , the optimal bijective power mapping with zero bilinear equations has exponent . This mapping has the same nonlinearity and differential uniform property as the inverse mapping, however, there is a tradeoff between the degree and the number of bilinear equations. The inverse mapping has 29 bi-affine equations and its degree is where as the mapping with exponent has zero bilinear equations and its degree is . Note that exponent for is the same as the one defined in Theorems 3 and 8. Table IV shows power mappings which have zero quadratic  equations for and . An in the second column indicates that the mapping is nonbijective. From the table it is clear that for and , there is no cryptographically good bijective power mapping with zero quadratic equations. Table V shows highly nonlinear bijective power mappings for and . Columns six and seven in the table give the number of bi-affine and quadratic equations, respectively. Tables III, IV, and V are optimal in terms of bi-affine equations, quadratic equations, and nonlinearity, respectively. Our experiments show that there does not exist an S-box (for ) which is optimal in terms of all the properties listed in Table V . Therefore, we relax our criteria to obtain S-boxes that are optimal or close to optimal in terms of the desired properties. According to the relaxed criteria an S-box based on power mapping must have the following properties.
• It is bijective.
• for even and for odd.
• At most bi-affine equations.
• At most differentially -uniform where .
• . A few S-boxes obtained according to the above criteria are listed in Table VI. 
VI. BIJECTIVE POWER MAPPINGS WITH MAXIMUM NUMBER OF QUADRATIC EQUATIONS
It was stated to be an open problem in [7] , [8] to find a bijective nonlinear S-box that would give strictly more than linearly independent quadratic equations. We provide bijective nonlinear S-boxes, where the number of linearly independent quadratic equations is much larger than . For example, from Algorithm 2 it can be checked that for exponent gives 66 quadratic equations. Also, for and , exponents and give 91, 120, 153, 190, and 276 quadratic equations, respectively. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed techniques to calculate the number of multivariate bi-affine and quadratic equations for S-boxes based on power mappings. We also provided two simple and efficient algorithms which are practical even for very large S-boxes. The S-box constructions given in Sections IV-A and IV-B have provable optimal . We also gave experimental results for power S-boxes with high algebraic immunity, nonlinearity, algebraic degree, and good uniform differential property. We identified two classes of Kasami-like power mappings with good . One class is known to be APN. The second class is known to be highly nonlinear and we conjectured that it is also differentially -uniform. We also identified bijective nonlinear S-boxes that have lowest and disproved a conjecture that AES S-box satisfies the largest number of quadratic equations. . The proof for odd is similar.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: Consider the binary representation of 1) and from the binary representation of it is obvious that .
2) If
, where then divides . This means that for even binary representation of must contain at least two runs of 's of the same length and two runs of 's of same length. We get two runs of 's when . Except for the case where can never fulfill this condition. We get three runs of 's when . However, we always have one run of 's of length and one run of 's of length , so the above condition is not satisfied. More than three runs are impossible in the binary representation of . For odd we must have at least three runs of 's of same length in the binary representation of which is impossible from the above reasoning. Therefore, and . Also, it is evident from the binary representation of that . 3) We know that if two integers and belong to the same coset then some cyclic shift of binary representation of gives . The binary representation of has one run of 's when , however, the length of the run is For each has same Hamming weight but either the runs of 's and 's are of different length or they appear in different order. Therefore, for each , belongs to a distinct coset. Also, only when , however, in both cases the length of runs of 's is different from . The three necessary and sufficient conditions for to have zero bi-affine equations (from Section IV-A) are satisfied. Table VII lists all cryptographically significant S-boxes based on power mappings for and . For and , the data has been omitted due to its large size and can be downloaded from Guang Gong's website. Let be a power mapping on which an S-box is based, then every S-box in the list satisfies the following criteria.
APPENDIX D CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY SIGNIFICANT POWER MAPPINGS
• At most bi-affine equations • It is at most differentially -uniform where .
• .
